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I. INTRODUCTION
On December 6, 1886, the United States Supreme Court handed
down two opinions, both written by the same justice and both dealing
with related issues of extradition. However, despite their common or-
igin and subject matter, the opinions point in philosophically opposite
directions. One opinion, United States v. Rauscher,' points toward
the increased protection of individual rights by incorporating conven-
tional international law constraints into the fabric of domestic law to
protect an extradited person. The second opinion, Ker v. Illinois,2
points toward a diminished set of individual rights. It condones a
state's usage of whatever means it has, legal or illegal, to bring to trial
a person abducted from a foreign state. Perhaps not surprisingly,
most courts have followed Ker's path. Rauscher is, by contrast,
largely forgotten.
In spite of its rare use, Rauscher's analysis cannot easily be dis-
missed. This Article will discuss one recent case which relies on Rau-
scher. It will argue that judicial limitations on Rauscher's thrust are
generally inappropriate and particularly troublesome where an extra-
J.D., Stanford Law School, 1975; Ph.D., Carnegie-Mellon University, 1972; Member
of the California State Bar. I want to thank Helen Kim and Cornell Winston, librarians at
Munger, Tolles & Olson, for locating books all over Los Angeles. I also want to thank Doreen
Guillen for typing pages of hieroglyphics into readable form.
1. 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
2. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
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dition treaty expressly protects nationals of one of the contracting
parties.
In the United States, as in most other countries, 3 extradition is,
and has been throughout the nation's entire history, a creature of
treaty.4 The United States has entered into more than ninety bilateral
extradition treaties. 5 Despite the intricate and long-standing web of
bilateral extradition treaties,6 United States law enforcement officers
have increasingly relied on "informal" means of removing suspects
from other nations. 7 In many of those cases, the defendant made a
colorable argument that the removal violated the terms of an extradi-
tion treaty between the United States and the asylum country. How-
ever, with only a few exceptions, courts have held that such
extraditions did not violate the treaty. Often, the court's rationale
focused on the fact that the asylum state either affirmatively assisted
in the removal, through the participation of its police or military per-
sonnel,8 or acquiesced in the removal by failing to protest the action.9
In cases where the asylum state does not protest, courts posit that the
violation of an extradition treaty violates a duty owed to the other
state treaty party and that, at most, the defendant can raise that state
party's rights derivatively.10
3. I. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 22 (1971). A vast literature
exists on extradition. See, e.g., M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, UNITED
STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 189 n.1 (2d rev. ed. 1987); O'Higgins, Unlawful Seizure and
Irregular Extradition, 36 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 279 & n.1 (1961); Harvard Research on Interna-
tional Law, Draft Convention on Extradition, with Comments, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. SuPP. 15
(1935).
4. See, e.g., Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 8 (1936). See
generally Ex parte McCabe, 46 F. 363, 369-81 (W.D. Tex. 1891); Garner, Non-Extradition of
American Citizens-The Neidecker Case, 30 AM. J. INT'L L. 480 (1936) (criticizing both Val-
entine and McCabe on a separate point); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181-95 (1988). Other countries permit
extradition as a matter of reciprocity or comity. M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 3, at 625-36.
5. See 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1988).
6. The United States is also a party to one multilateral extradition treaty. Multilateral
Convention on Extradition, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3111, T.S. No. 882.
7. See Lowenfeld, U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and International
Law, Continued, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 444 (1990). The appellate reports are full of examples of
the practice of employing informal methods of extraditing individuals from other countries.
See, e.g., United States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v. Reed, 639
F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Toro, 840 F.2d 1221 (5th Cir. 1988); Leighnor v.
Turner, 884 F.2d 385 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420 (9th Cir. 1986).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32, 38 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v.
Valot, 625 F.2d 308, 310 (9th Cir. 1980).
9. See, e.g., Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 259-60 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 209 (1990); United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 67 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975).
10. Gengler, 510 F.2d at 67.
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Recently, a case arose in the United States District Court for the
Central District of California where the state from which the defend-
ant was kidnapped did in fact protest." In that case, United States
officials charged a Mexican doctor, Humberto Alvarez-Machain, with
participating in the torture and murder of a Drug Enforcement Ad-
ministration ("DEA") agent, Enrique Camarena. 12 An official of the
Mexican Federal Judicial Police ("MFJP") approached a DEA agent
investigating the Camarena murder about exchanging Alvarez-
Machain for a Mexican fugitive in the United States. 13 After the
transfer deal collapsed, the DEA abducted Alvarez-Machain, using a
DEA informant and various Mexican citizens, including former mili-
tary police officers, civilians, and at least two current police officers.14
Alvarez-Machain's abductors transported him to El Paso, Texas,
where he was taken into custody. After Alvarez-Machain's kidnap-
ping, the Mexican government presented a diplomatic note to the
United States Department of State as a means of protest. This note
claimed that Alvarez-Machain's abduction and transfer from Mexico
violated the extradition procedure in the United States-Mexico Extra-
dition Treaty' 5 and demanded his return to Mexico.
16
Alvarez-Machain moved to dismiss the indictment based on out-
rageous government conduct, the treaty violation, and lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction. Applying the maxim of mala captus, bene
detentus17 adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Ker, and
11. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599 (C.D. Cal. 1990). This is not the
first case in which defendants asserted a violation of the United States-Mexico Extradition
Treaty. See, e.g., Ex parte Lopez, 6 F. Supp. 342 (S.D. Tex. 1934) (citing Ker, and not Rau-
scher, court refused to discharge prisoner allegedly abducted by United States marshalls acting
in conjunction with Mexican police); Ex parte Campbell, 1 F. Supp. 899 (S.D. Tex. 1932);
Dominquez v. State, 90 Tex. Crim. 92, 97-100 (1921) (assuming existence of treaty, Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals ordered release of defendant seized by United States expeditionary
force in Mexico); see also Dickinson, Jurisdiction Following Seizure on Arrest in Violation of
International Law, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 231, 233-34 (1954) (discussion of Dominquez).
12. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 601.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 602.
15. Extradition Treaty between the United States of America and the United Mexican
States, January 25, 1980, 31 U.S.T. 5059, T.I.A.S. No. 9656 [hereinafter United States-Mexico
Extradition Treaty].
16. The case immediately caught academic attention. See Lowenfeld, Kidnapping by
Government Order: A Follow Up, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 712 (1990).
17. Under this maxim, national courts will assert in personam jurisdiction without inquir-
ing into the means by which the presence of the defendant was secured. M.C. BAssiOuNI,
supra note 3, at 190.
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later in Frisbie v. Collins,18 the court rejected the defendant's outra-
geous conduct claim.19 However, the court accepted Alvarez-
Machain's treaty-violation argument. The court's analysis hinged on
the fact that the Mexican government had protested Alvarez-
Machain's kidnapping. 20 The court held that there could not be a
violation of an extradition treaty without protest by the asylum coun-
try; since Alvarez-Machain caught the attention of his own govern-
ment, he won.21
The court's requirement that the other state protest the extradi-
tion, a requirement followed by most circuits and many foreign juris-
18. 342 U.S. 519, reh'g denied, 343 U.S. 937 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 19 U.S. 436 (1886).
In Ker, the Supreme Court held that the fact that a private detective from Peru kidnapped the
defendant did not deprive the Illinois courts of jurisdiction. The Court made this ruling in the
face of a valid extradition treaty between Peru and the United States. In Ker, no governmental
action occurred, thus arguably creating no treaty violation. Id. at 443. The Supreme Court
expressly declined to decide "how far [Ker's] forcible seizure in another country, and transfer
by violence, force, or fraud to this country, could be made available to resist trial in the state
court...." Id. That question was within the jurisdiction of the Illinois courts. Frisbie ap-
plied Ker to interstate abduction. The approach taken by the Court is known as the Ker-
Frisbie doctrine.
Ker appears to concur with the law in many common-law jurisdictions. See State v.
Brewster, 7 Vt. 118, 121-22 (1835); Exparte Scott, 9 B. & C. 446, 109 Eng. Rep. 166 (K.B.
1829); Abrahams v. Minister of Justice, [1963] 4 S. Afr. L.R. 542; Afouneh v. Attorney-Gen-
eral, 10 ANN. DIG. & REP. OF INT'L L. CAsEs 327 (No. 97) (Palestine, Supreme Court 1942);
Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 18, 58-76 (Israel, Dist. Ct. 1961), aff'd, 36
I.L.R. 277, 304-08 (Israel, Supreme Court 1962). It is also the law in France, Belgium, and
Germany. See, e.g., Re Argoud, 45 I.L.R. 90, 96-97 (France, Cour de Cassation, Crim. Chain.
1964); Geldof v. Meulemeester and Steffen, 41 I.L.R. 385 (Belgium, Cour de Cassation 1961);
Extradition (Jurisdiction) Case, 8 ANN. DIG. & REP. OF PUB. INT'L L. CASES 348 (No. 165)
(Germany, Supreme Court 1936). See also Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and Jurisdiction
Following Forcible Abduction: A New Israeli Precedent in International Law, 72 MICH. L. REV.
1037, 1106-09 (1974). Scholars, however, have pointed out that the basic English cases, like
Ker, which relied on Scott, do not involve violations of international law. O'Higgins, supra
note 3, at 280-87. But see Comte, Note, 45 I.L.R. 98 (1972). In 1935, Professor Dickinson, as
editor, proposed an article in the Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crimes
that would have forbidden prosecution or punishment of a person "brought within [a state's]
territory or a place subject to its authority by recourse to measures in violation of international
law or international convention without first obtaining the consent of the State or States whose
rights have been violated by such measures." Harvard Research on International Law, Draft
Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crimes, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. SupP. 439, 623 (1935)
(emphasis added). Professor Dickinson recognized that the italicized language was not "every-
where agreed" and that the article would be "in part in the nature of legislation." Id. at 624.
19. This Article will not discuss that element of the case, because, while the legal princi-
ple may be abhorrent, the analysis under that principle is straightforward and consistent with
precedent. "This maxim ... is certainly not from Virgil [and] gives out a rather cynical and
unpleasing odour ... " Comte, supra note 18, at 104.
20. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 608-09.
21. Id.
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dictions, raises troubling questions about the effect of extradition
treaties in domestic United States law and the status of individuals in
international law. In particular, the district court- did not explain why
a concededly self-executing treaty does not bestow rights on individu-
als in the absence of a protest by the individual's nation. Nor did the
decision satisfactorily justify a narrow standing doctrine to enforce
extradition treaties, in which rights are conferred on governments, but
not on their citizens. 22 This Article briefly considers these issues.
II. SEFING THE STAGE FOR CARO-QUINTERO: THE CAMARENA
MURDER AND THE ALVAREZ-MACHAIN ABDUCTION
In February 1985, DEA Agent Camarena was kidnapped, tor-
tured, and murdered in Guadalajara, Mexico. 23 In United States v.
Caro-Quintero,24 the government returned a sixth superseding indict-
ment charging twenty-two people, including Alvarez-Machain, with
various crimes in connection with the Camarena torture-murder. By
August 4, 1990, seven of the twenty-two people had been brought to
the United States to stand trial. Significantly, of the seven, three ap-
peared before the court "by means of covert forcible abduction from
their homelands." 25
Locating the various suspects resulted from a major effort by
DEA officers. The DEA organized "Operation Leyenda" to capture
Camarena's murderers. As part of the operation, they used an in-
formant, Antonio Garate-Bustamante, a former employee of a major
Mexican drug trafficker, Ernesto Fonseca-Coreo. Eventually, the Na-
tional Broadcasting Company ("NBC") aired a "mini-series" based
22. While this Article was in press, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit decided another case arising out of the Camarena incident, United States v. Verdugo-
Urguidez, 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991). The court found that a person in United States
custody, who allegedly had been kidnapped from Mexico with the assistance of United States
officials, could assert a treaty violation where Mexico protested the kidnapping. However, in
dictum, the court wrote that "[i]f the Mexican government were to withdraw its formal pro-
test, [the kidnapped individual] would no longer be entitled to object to the court's exercise of
personal jurisdiction over him." Verudgo-Urguidez, 939 F.2d at 1361-62. The conclusion is
contrary to the conclusion of this Article, unless it is assumed that the withdrawal of the
protest is equivalent to acquiescence in the kidnapping.
23. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 601-02.
24. Id. at 602.
25. Id. The other two abductions were not in connection with this case. See Matta-
Ballesteros ex rel. Stolar v. Henman, 697 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D. Ill. 1988), aff'd, 896 F.2d 255
(7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 110
S. Ct. 1056 (1990).
1991]
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upon the murder and the DEA's subsequent investigation. 26
Law enforcement authorities suspected Alvarez-Machain of as-
sisting Camarena's murderers by keeping Camarena alive during the
torture in an effort to extract additional information. The DEA ini-
tially attempted to obtain Alvarez-Machain's presence in the United
States with the "informal" assistance of Mexican officials. 27 In De-
cember 1989, an MFJP Commandante, Jorge Castillo del Rey, ar-
ranged a meeting with Garate-Bustamante to discuss an exchange of
"a Mexican national suspected of involvement in the Camarena kill-
ing" 28 for a Mexican citizen residing in the United States. On Decem-
ber 13, 1989, two DEA agents, including Hector Berrellez, the agent
in charge of Operation Leyenda, met in Los Angeles with Castillo and
another MFJP commandante.
At this meeting, Castillo informed the agents that he was work-
ing under Javier Orosco-Orosco, the chief of the MFJP fugitive detail
in Mexico City.29 Castillo further told the agents that he came to the
meeting with the full knowledge and authority of the Attorney Gen-
eral of Mexico.30 At the meeting, the parties struck an accord regard-
ing the delivery of Alvarez-Machain to the United States. Castillo
and the agents also discussed the possible initiation of deportation
proceedings against a Mexican citizen in the United States whom the
Mexican Attorney General wished to try for the theft of large sums of
money from Mexican politicians.3 1 However, the deal fell through
when the DEA refused to advance the Mexican officials $50,000 to
cover the expense of transporting Alvarez-Machain to the United
States.3
2
Meanwhile, Agent Berrellez instructed Garate-Bustamante to in-
form his contacts in Mexico that the DEA would pay for information
leading to the arrest and capture of individuals responsible for
Camarena's death. 33 Garate-Bustamante in turn informed Berrellez
that his "associates" in Mexico could deliver Alvarez-Machain to cus-
26. Drug Wars: The Camarena Story (NBC television broadcast, Jan. 7-9, 1990). The
series itself exacerbated already tense relations between the Mexican government and the gov-
ernment of the United States.
27. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 602.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 603.
33. Id.
[Vol. 13:765
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tody in the United States.34 Berrellez told Garate-Bustamante that
the DEA would pay those "associates" a $50,000 reward plus ex-
penses for Alvarez-Machain's delivery; Berrellez testified that his au-
thorization came not only from his superiors in the Los Angeles
division of the DEA, but also from the Deputy Director of the DEA,
in Washington, D.C. The parties worked out the details of the abduc-
tion during March 1990. Berrellez testified that the DEA approved
the abduction in Washington, D.C. Further, he stated that he be-
lieved that the United States Attorney General's office had been con-
sulted in the matter.
35
On April 2, 1990, five or six armed men abducted Alvarez-
Machain from his office in Guadalajara.3 6 During and after the ab-
duction, his kidnappers hit him in the stomach, forced him to lie on
the floor face-down for two hours and, he testified, "shocked [him] six
or seven times through the soles of his shoes with an 'electric shock
apparatus.' "37 Alvarez-Machain claimed that he was injected twice
with a substance that made him feel "light-headed and dizzy."38
The abductors then transported Alvarez-Machain by car to
Leon, Mexico. Once in Leon, they boarded a twin-engine airplane
and were joined by a man who stated that he was affiliated with the
DEA. The plane flew to El Paso and dropped Alvarez-Machain off at
the airport, where Berrellez, Garate-Bustamante, and others were
waiting on the runway. As Alvarez-Machain left the plane, he alleg-
edly heard one of the abductors say, "[w]e are Mexican police, here is
your fugitive."' 39 The DEA had paid the abductors a partial reward of
$20,000 as of May 25, 1990. The DEA also evacuated seven of the
abductors and their families from Mexico to the United States. The
DEA continues to pay the expenses of these persons in the amount of
approximately $6,000 per week.40
On April 18, 1990, Mexico's embassy presented a diplomatic
note to the United States Department of State, seeking "a detailed
report on possible U.S. participation in the abduction" of Alvarez-
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. At the time of the abduction, one of the armed men showed Alvarez-Machain
what appeared to be a badge of the federal police. The abductors instructed Alvarez-Machain
to cooperate, or else they would shoot him.
37. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 603.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 604.
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Machain. 41 On May 16, 1990, the Mexican embassy presented a sec-
ond diplomatic note to the Department of State. The second note
stated that
the Government of Mexico considers that the kidnapping of Dr.
Alvarez-Machain and his transfer from Mexican territory to the
United States of America were carried out with the knowledge of
persons working for the U.S. government, in violation of the proce-
dure established in the extradition treaty in force between the two
countries.
The government of Mexico also demanded Alvarez-Machain's return
to Mexico. 42 On July 19, 1990, the Mexican embassy presented an-
other diplomatic note to the State Department, this time seeking the
arrest and extradition of Garate-Bustamante and Berrellez to stand
trial in Mexico for crimes related to Alvarez-Machain's abduction.
43
III. CARo-QuiNTERO: HOW THE DISTRICT COURT RESOLVED
ALVAREZ-MACHAIN'S CHALLENGES TO EXTRADITION
On Alvarez-Machain's motion, the district court dismissed the
indictment against him on the ground that the United States had vio-
lated the United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty." The court first
found that the Ker-Frisbie doctrine does not apply when there is a
violation of "federal treaty law."'45 The court relied heavily on United
41. Id.
42. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 603.
43. Id.
44. The district court rejected Alvarez-Machan's argument that it lacked jurisdiction
over him because he had been denied due process of law under the fifth amendment. Id. at
605. The court wrote: "There is nothing in the Constitution that requires a court to permit a
guilty person to escape justice because he was brought to trial against his will." Id. (quoting
Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952)); cf United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474 (1980);
INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039-40 (1984); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119
(1975). The court also held that the "Toscanino exception" to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine did not
apply. In United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Ci. 1974), the Second Circuit held
that if a defendant shows that the United States engaged in torture in the process of the extra-
dition, the defendant's due process rights are violated. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961);
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 145 (1952).
Courts in other nations have adopted similar approaches. See, e.g., R. v. Hartley, [1978] 2
N.Z.L.R. 199 (New Zealand, Ct. App. 1977) (in dictum, the court stated that an arrest by New
Zealand police, after Australian police put prisoner on plane for New Zealand at informal
request of New Zealand police, constituted abuse of process); Ex parte Mackeson, 75 Crim.
App. R. 74 (1981) (England, Ct. App. 1981) (court ordered discharge of defendant fraudu-
lently induced to leave Zimbabwe). But see United States v. Fielding, 645 F.2d 719, 723 (9th
Cir. 1981) (Toscanino requires conduct that is "shocking to the conscience").
45. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 606.
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States v. Rauscher in reaching that conclusion.4" As discussed below,
Rauscher dealt with a variation of the treaty-violation theme. In Rau-
scher, the defendant was legally extradited from Great Britain pursu-
ant to an extradition treaty, but was prosecuted for an offense not
listed in the treaty. Because the prosecution involved a non-listed of-
fense, it violated the "doctrine of specialty. ' '47 Consequently, the
United States Supreme Court ordered that Rauscher be returned to
Great Britain.
48
The district court in Caro-Quintero held that the United States-
Mexico Extradition Treaty was "self-executing. '49 According to the
court, "[a] self-executing treaty is federal law which must be enforced
in federal court unless superseded by other federal law. A self-execut-
ing treaty is enforceable without resort to implementing legislation by
Congress."50 The court contrasted self-executing treaties with execu-
tory treaties, which are not enforceable in court and are "the subject
of international negotiations and reclamations, so far as the injured
party chooses to seek redress .... ,,51 Significantly, the court stated,
without discussion, that "[e]xtradition treaties by their nature are
deemed self-executing and thus are enforceable without the aid of im-
plementing legislation."' 5
2
The court's analysis in reaching this holding is somewhat un-
clear. First, the question whether a treaty is self-executing generally
warrants some discussion of the actual terms of the treaty.5 3 Yet the
court did not discuss the treaty's language at all. Second, the court
apparently believed self-executing extradition treaties are enforceable
in court, but only by the states who are treaty parties, not by
46. Id.; cf Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 121 (1933); Ford v. United States, 273
U.S. 593 (1927); Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 278; United States v. Ferris, 19 F.2d 925, 926 (N.D.
Cal. 1927).
47. This doctrine stands for the proposition that the requesting state, which secures the
surrender of a person, can prosecute that person only for the offense for which he or she was
surrendered by the requested state or else allow that person an opportunity to leave the prose-
cuting state to which he or she had been surrendered. M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL
EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 353 (1974).
48. 119 U.S. at 433.
49. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 606.
50. Id.
51. Id. (quoting Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884)).
52. Id. at 607 (citing M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 3, at 71-72, 74).
53. Indeed, two of the earliest Supreme Court cases involving self-executing treaties
turned on whether the documents involved were translated into English or kept in their origi-
nal Spanish. See United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833); Foster & Elam v.
Nielson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
19911 773
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individuals. 54
After deciding that the treaty was self-executing, the court held
that Alvarez-Machain had no standing by himself to raise the issue of
the treaty violation. Beginning its analysis with the notion that inter-
national obligations exist solely between states, the court followed a
long line of cases holding that individuals have no standing to raise
violations of international law. 55 The court recognized that the cir-
cuits have split as to whether an individual, as opposed to a state, can
raise a violation of the doctrine of specialty. However, it held that
Alvarez-Machain's case did not involve a specialty issue. Accord-
ingly, the court found that "it is for the State, and not the individual,
to initially protest and thereby raise a claim that the method of secur-
ing a person's presence violates an extradition treaty. The individual's
standing to raise this claim is purely derivative of that of the State. ' 56
The court's reasoning on this issue is somewhat opaque. First,
the court did not explain the basis of the holdings in the cases upon
which it relied. Second, the court relied upon a misreading of Rau-
scher, stating that in that case, the sovereign had protested under the
treaty, when in fact, Rauscher himself made the protest. 5
7
After deciding that Alvarez-Machain individually did not pos-
sess standing, the court dealt with two arguments raised by the gov-
ernment. First, the court rejected the government's argument that it
was not chargeable with the actions of the abductors. The court held
that the abductors were, in fact, United States agents after noting
that: (1) the DEA had induced the abductors to act with its offer of a
reward and reimbursement of expenses; (2) the DEA had given ap-
proval to the abduction; (3) United States officials of the highest levels
were involved; and (4) the DEA had in fact paid a $20,000 reward
and had relocated some of the abductors and their families to the
United States. 58
The court then discussed at length the government's contention
that it had not violated the extradition treaty because no formal extra-
dition proceedings had taken place. The government based its argu-
ment on cases holding that extradition treaties do not "purport to
describe procedural requirements for extradition incumbent upon the
54. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 607.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 608.
57. See infra text accompanying notes 86-100.
58. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 609.
[Vol. 13:765
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rendering state." 9 The court, however, relied upon the principle that
extradition treaties do limit the receiving state's behavior.6 0 Citing
Rauscher, which held that the doctrine of specialty restricts the re-
ceiving state, the court wrote emphatically:
[t]he government's contention in the present case that a state vio-
lates an extradition treaty when it prosecutes for a crime other
than that for which the individual was extradited (the doctrine of
specialty), but not when a state unilaterally flouts the procedures of
the extradition treaty altogether and abducts an individual for
prosecution on whatever crimes it chooses, is absurd.6'
The government relied upon Ker and a line of cases in which the
rendering state had consented or acquiesced in the defendant's re-
moval. Ker, according to the court, did not apply because the abduc-
tor in that case was a private citizen not acting under any United
States authority. Thus, in Ker, the United States had not violated the
treaty. 62 The court distinguished the other line of cases because Mex-
ico had not only abstained from participating in the abduction, but
had protested it. The court rejected the government's argument that
it did not violate the treaty because certain of the abductors had been
Mexican police officers on active duty, finding that they acted outside
the scope of their authority. 63 The court also rejected the applicabil-
.ity of another related line of cases in which the rendering state did not
participate in the abduction, did not register a protest, and thus was
held to acquiesce in the abduction. 64
Finally, the court stated that the United States had acted unilat-
erally and, given the Mexican government's official protest, had vio-
lated the treaty.65 Concluding its opinion, the court held that the
proper remedy under international law was reparation and that, in
this case, reparation constituted the return of Alvarez-Machain to
Mexico.66
59. Najhon, 785 F.2d at 1422; Cordero, 668 F.2d at 38.
60. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 610.
61. Id. The court further stated that it is "axiomatic" that the United States or Mexico
violates the sovereignty of the receiving state when it unilaterally kidnaps a person from the
asylum state and the asylum state protests. Id.
62. Id. at 611.
63. Id. at 612.
64. Id. at 613. See, e.g., United States v. Toro, 840 F.2d 1221, 1235 (5th Cir. 1988);
United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1981); United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510
F.2d 62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975).
65. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 614.
66. Id. The court also rejected Alvarez-Machain's attempt to rely upon various multilat-
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IV. CARO-QUINTERO'S PARADIGM: AN INDIVIDUAL LACKS THE
RIGHT TO PROTEST HER OWN ABDUCTION
The Alvarez-Machain matter presents the following paradigm:
The United States abducts a Mexican citizen from Mexico, a state
that has an extradition treaty with the United States. People acting as
agents of the United States government, without following any proce-
dures set forth in the extradition treaty, perpetrate this abduction.
The extradition treaty precludes the extradition of nationals without
the specific consent of Mexico. 67 Yet, the person extradited cannot
raise the potential treaty violation unless Mexico first raises the issue.
While treaties, including extradition treaties, generally create
rights and duties only between states,68 if there existed any situation
in which one might expect an extradition treaty to give rights to an
individual, Alvarez-Machain's would seem to be the case. Presuma-
bly, one of a state's duties is to protect its citizens. Therefore, a pre-
sumptive treaty violation should take place when one state violates a
treaty that expressly protects identified individuals.
To understand why this seemingly obvious point is not self-evi-
dent requires an understanding of the role of extradition treaties. His-
torically, substantial theoretical questions existed as to whether a duty
to extradite existed in customary international law. State practice
uniformly supported the view that there was no such duty.69 Thus,
states were forced to grant asylum or to refuse to extradite. Removal
of a person, either a national or a foreigner, from one state by agents
of a foreign state would seem to violate international law. 70 The viola-
eral treaties as sources of his rights and rejected his Toscanino argument that the court should
use its supervisory powers to dismiss the indictment. Id. at 614-15.
67. United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 15, art. IX.
68. See Argoud, 45 I.L.R. at 96 (individual could not argue violation of international
law); Garcia-Mora, Criminal Jurisdiction of a State Over Fugitives Brought from a Foreign
Country by Force or Fraud: A Comparative Study, 32 IND. L.J. 427, 436 & n.54 (1957); cf. In
re Jolis, 7 ANN. DIG. & REP. OF PUB. INT'L L. CAsES 91 (France, Tribunal Correctional
d'Avenes 1933) (Belgian government protested abduction by French police on Belgian terri-
tory). But see Fiscal v. Samper, 9 ANN. DIG. & REP. OF PUB. INT'L CASES 402, 405 (Spain,
Supreme Court 1934) (right belongs to individual).
69. See M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 3, at 5-12; I. SHEARER, supra note 3, at 23-24.
70. See generally L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 295-96 (Lauterpacht 8th ed.
1955); Borchard, The Kasenkina Case, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 858 (1948); Morgenstern, Jurisdic-
tion in Seizures Effected in Violation of International Law, 29 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 265 (1952);
Note, Jurisdiction After International Kidnapping: A Comparative Study, 8 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 237 (1985); Villareal v. Hammond, 74 F.2d 503, 505-06 (5th Cir. 1934) (dic-
tum); Collier v. Vaccaro, 51 F.2d 17, 19 (4th Cir. 1931) (dictum). In Villareal and Collier, the
defendants were returned to Mexico and Canada respectively, pursuant to extradition treaties,
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tion of international law would occur when those acting on behalf of
one state exercise sovereign power-which an arrest clearly consti-
tutes-in the territory of a second state. The offended state could,
therefore, request the abducting state to return the captive if there was
a customary norm proscribing abductions. 71
For over 3000 years, states have entered into extradition treaties
in order to obtain the return of fugitives, 72 although the practice has
for kidnappings within Mexico and Canada. In the absence of a treaty, the kidnapper would
not be extraditable. See 4 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 226-27 (1940) (at request of United States government, Canadian government
returned United States citizen taken to Canada by Canadian police).
71. E.g., O'Higgins, supra note 3, at 305-06 (discussing the Blair case); see Preuss, Kid-
napping of Fugitives from Justice on Foreign Territory, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 502, 505-06 (1935);
Preuss, Settlement of Jacob Kidnapping Case, 30 AM. J. INT'L L. 123 (1936) (German nation-
als kidnapped Swiss citizen from Basel, Switzerland, driven across borders to Germany and
arrested; Swiss government lodged protest with German government and, after arbitration
proceeding initiated, Germany returned Swiss citizen to Switzerland); id. at 124 n.6. (British
citizen kidnapped from United States by British detectives; United States government pro-
tested and English government returned British citizen to United States); Affaire Mantovani,
Italia et Suisse, Rousseau, Chronique des Faits Internationaux, 69 Revue Generale De Droit
International Public 761, 834-35 (1965) (Italian policeman captured Italian national on Swiss
territory and took him to Italy; Swiss police took him back to Switzerland; after protest by
Swiss Attorney General, high Italian police official apologized and assured Swiss that every-
thing was being done to prevent a repetition); Cole, Extradition Treaties Abound But Unlawful
Seizures Continue, INT'L PERSPECTIVES 40 (discussing the Anderson case) (Mar.-Apr. 1975)
(United States army deserter sighted crossing from Canada into the United States; customs
officials pursued him back across border, captured him and turned him over to FBI; Canadian
government formally requested his return and United States government agreed.); Case of
Nollet, 18 JOURNAL Du DRorr INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 1188 (France, Cour d'Appel de
Douai 1891) (court ordered release of French fugitive wrongly arrested in Belgium by Belgian
authorities); In re Jolis, 7 ANN. DIG. & REP. OF PUB. INT'L L. CASES 191 (No. 77) (France,
Tribunal Correctional d'Avesnes 1933) (French fugitive arrested in Belgium by French author-
ities ordered released). United States practice in this area is "contradictory and confused."
Garcia-Mora, supra note 68, at 438. See generally Sponsler, International Kidnapping, 5 INT'L
LAW. 27, 37 (1971).
There is, however, a question whether a violation exists. In one case, an arbitral panel
held that the prosecuting state had no obligation to return the defendant. ScoTT, HAGUE CT.
REvs. 276 (1911) (Savakar Case: France v. Great Britain, Paris Ct. of Arb.). For a discussion
and related citations, see 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 70, at 703 n. 1. If the cases in which
states returned abducted individuals are examples of comity, rather than a belief that an obli-
gation exists to return the person, there would be no customary norm. The existence of a
customary norm requires both longstanding international practice and opinio juris sive neces-
sitatis, a belief that the practice is obligatory. Stat. I.C.J., art. 38(1)(b) (International Court of
Justice shall use "international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law");
Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1974-75); RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2)
(1986); Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States), [1986] I.C.J. 14, 97-98.
72. I. SHEARER, supra note 3, at 5.
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really only developed in the past 200 years.73 Extradition treaties, by
which states agree to extradite people for certain crimes under a
proper request, diminish a state's customary international law right to
grant asylum or to decline to extradite.
One may argue that an extradition treaty gives the state no more
right to protest an abduction than it already possesses under custom-
ary law. However, the issue is two-fold: first, is there an international
norm against abductions, and second, will domestic courts enforce
that norm? With regard to the first question, as this Article has al-
ready discussed, questions exist as to the presence of an international
norm.74 With regard to the second question, a more difficult issue
arises. United States courts have assumed an ambivalent relationship
with customary international law. On one hand, they have long as-
similated parts of it into domestic law.75 Thus, under this analysis, an
official abduction would lead to state responsibility for the act. On
the other hand, courts have subordinated customary international
law, not only to domestic statutory law,76 but also to "controlling ex-
ecutive acts. ' ' 77 Thus, according to this school of thought, even if a
customary norm required the release of an abducted person at the
request of the offended state, if the executive branch opposed the re-
lease, some doubt would exist as to whether courts would enforce the
norm.
The presence of a treaty might yield a different result.78 Treaties
73. Id.
74. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
75. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876,
880-81 (2d Cir. 1980).
76. E.g., Tag v. Rogers, 267 F.2d 664, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 904
(1960) (subsequent act of Congress supersedes customary international law); see Goldklang,
Back on Board the Paquete Habana: Resolving the Conflict Between Statute and Customary
International Law, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 143, 149, 151 (1984); see also Trimble, A Revisionist View
of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665, 727-31 (1986). But see Henkin, The
Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny,
100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 875-77 (1987).
77. E.g., Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453-54 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
899 (1986). This follows Justice Gray's dictum in The Paquete-Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.
78. Commentators have criticized the distinction. E.g., Dickinson, supra note 11, at 239-
40; Sponsler, supra note 71, at 45-46. However, Professor Sponsler's argument, which notes
the difference between Ker and Rauscher, may be slightly off-point. In Ker, a violation of
custom may not have taken place. On the other hand, even if the abductor in Ker was not an
agent of the government, the government arguably violated customary law by proceeding
against Ker. Cf Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (finding state action when there is
judicial enforcement of private agreements); see Note, supra note 70, at 248 n. 104 (continued
incarceration is state action).
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rank with federal statutes as sources of law.79 United States courts
apply the rule of lex posteriori 80 to give effect to treaties that conflict
with prior statutes and, afortiori, executive branch positions.81 Thus,
an official abduction in violation of a treaty would be illegal, both as a
matter of international and domestic law. If customary international
law recognizes such a violation, the essential violation of a state's
rights would have already occurred, but the treaty would give a state
additional grounds to request the return of the fugitive. The Caro-
Quintero court apparently believed that the extradition treaty had this
effect. The court noted that the treaty was self-executing. In the
court's view, this allowed Mexico to seek judicial redress in United
States courts and, because the court construed Alvarez-Machain's
rights as derivative of Mexico's, he could seek judicial redress as an
individual. 82
Under the almost universally-shared view expressed in Caro-
Quintero, extradition treaties protect states' rights, not individuals'
rights. Therefore, the Caro-Quintero court wrote that no violation of
the treaty would occur in the absence of a protest by the aggrieved
state, no matter what the abducted person did.83 This is not a neces-
sary conclusion. The purpose of the protest is to announce that a
violation has occurred and to take measures to obtain the return of
the abducted individual. States may choose to ignore violations of
their international rights or respond to them in a number of ways.84
By protesting that it did not acquiesce in the abduction, Mexico
showed that its rights were violated, and only incidentally empowered
Alvarez-Machain to proceed.
However, the more pertinent question from the defendant's per-
79. U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
80. A latter statute reduces the effect of a prior statute. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 822
(5th ed. 1979).
81. Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194
(1888).
82. United States courts have sometimes held that, even when a treaty exists, the matter
is for diplomats to settle. See, e.g., Ex parte Lopez, 6 F. Supp. 342 (S.D. Tex. 1934); United
States v. Unverzagt, 299 F. 1015, 1018 (W.D. Wash. 1924).
83. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 606-07. The existence of a violation in the absence of
a protest may receive different treatment than the situation in which the extradition was
proper, but the extraditee was tried for an offense other than that for which he was extradited.
The latter situation is a violation of the rule of specialty. See L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 70, at
702 & n.4.
84. In a well-known case, Israel had abducted Adolph Eichmann from Argentina.
Rather than protest, Argentina simply agreed with Israel that the matter was closed. Sponsler,
supra note 71.
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spective remains whether she can seek a remedy if her asylum state
does not protest. In other words, the issue is whether she can exercise
these rights on her own.
The fact that a country violates customary international law by
abducting a person from another country does not assist the captive
once she is within the jurisdiction of the abducting country. With
limited exceptions, such as the protections accorded to diplomats and
aliens,8 5 customary international law historically focused on gov-
erning states' actions among themselves and did not concentrate on
regulating their behavior toward individuals within their jurisdic-
tion.86 Customary international law has rarely been thought to give
individuals private rights of action.
One should note that this formulation hardly describes contem-
porary customary international law. Generally, customary norms
protect against certain kinds of human rights violations.8 7 Currently,
United States courts view customary international law as binding
principally between and among states.88 The general reluctance to
find that customary rules apply to transgressions committed against
individuals extends to an individual's inability to protest illegal "ex-
traditions." There is no customary norm giving abducted individuals
a private right of action. 89
Likewise, as a "general rule," treaties do not create individual
85. Eg., Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 50 U.N.T.S. 95
(generally considered to codify principles of customary international law); Chattin Claim
(United States v. United Mexican States), 4 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 282 (United States-
Mexico General Claims Commission 1927) (arrest, trial, and sentence of United States citizen
in Mexico found illegal; Mexico ordered to pay monetary damages to the United States).
86. E.g., H. KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 215 (Knight trans. 1967).
87. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 702 (1987); see also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (customary
international norm forbids murder by agents of a state and gives individual tort cause of ac-
tion); Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), aff'd, 654 F.2d
1382 (10th Cir. 1981) (customary international law prohibits prolonged arbitrary detention).
But see Tel-Oran v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (no customary
international norm prohibits murder by nonstate actors).
88. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 111, R.N. 4 (1987).
89. At least one United States decision rejected an argument based on customary interna-
tional law. See United States v. Insull, 8 F. Supp. 310, 311-12 (N.D. Ill. 1934); see also
Afouneh v. Attorney General, 10 ANN. DIG. & REP. OF PUB. INT'L L. CASES 327 (No. 97)
(Palestine, Supreme Court 1942); cf In re Jolis, 7 ANN. DIG. & REP. OF PUB. INT'L L. CASES
91 (France, Tribunal Correctional d'Avenes (1933)) (Belgian government protested). The Nol-
let and Fiscal cases indicate that other states do not take a similarly constrained view. See
supra notes 68 and 71 and accompanying text.
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rights.90 However, treaties may create judicially enforceable rights for
individuals. In United States law, treaties are the "supreme law of the
land." 91 Upon ratification, only self-executing treaties create rights
enforceable in domestic courts.92 Beyond that, certain self-executing
treaties give enforceable rights to individuals within a contracting
state.93 Whether a treaty creates private rights depends upon the
intent of the parties to the treaty.94 A common viewpoint is that the
90. See, e.g., Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 722-25, 242 P.2d 617 (1952) (United
Nations Charter does not create "justiciable rights in private persons" in the absence of imple-
menting legislation); Hitai .v. I.N.S., 343 F.2d 466, 468 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816
(1965); Mannington Mills v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1298 (3d Cir. 1979). On the
enforcement of conventional human rights obligations by United States courts, see Lillich,
Invoking International Human Rights in Domestic Courts, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 367, 371-93
(1985). In Extradition (Jurisdiction) Case, 8 ANN. DIG. & REP. OF PUB. INT'L L. CASES 348
(No. 165) (Germany, Supreme Court 1936), the German Court held that the individual had no
right to raise the treaty-violation issue, unless the treaty specifically gave the right. See also In
re Colman, 14 ANN. DIG. & REP. OF PUB. INT'L L. CASES 139 (France, Cour d'appel de Paris
(Cham. de Mises en Accusation) 1947) (individual cannot rely on silence in treaty, which was
not made for his benefit).
91. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
92. See generally L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 156-61
(1972). Executory treaties are enforceable internationally, L e., by international arbitral tribu-
nals and by diplomatic means. See generally Evans, Self-Executing Treaties in the United
States of America, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 178 (1951). Obligations not to act are usually
treated as self-executing. Commonwealth v. Hawes, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 697, 702-03 (1878),
cited in Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 427-28. The notion of self-executing treaties is somewhat pecu-
liar to the United States legal system. J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 1068-69 (1988). But see Riesenfeld,
The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and U.S. v. Postal: Win at Any Price, 74 AM. J. INT'L
L. 892, 896 (1980); Evans, Self Executing Treaties in the United States of America, 30 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 178, 194-206 (1951). In Great Britain, treaties do not create domestic law in the
absence of implementing legislation. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 418; O'Higgins, supra note 3, at
301. On the other hand, in certain countries, treaties are automatically incorporated into do-
mestic law and have an authority superior to that of domestic legislation. See Sasse, The
Common Market: Between International and Municipal Law, 75 YALE L.J. 695, 712-13 (1966);
J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, supra, at 34-35; e.g., Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265
U.S. 332, 341 (1924).
93. Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 30 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976).
94. Professor Paust argues persuasively that the self-executing/executory dichotomy has
no support in constitutional history and has been used only episodically. See Paust, Self-Exe-
cuting Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 760 (1988). Additionally, he argues that the only executory
treaties are those which expressly provide that legislation is required. See id. at 781. The
history Professor Paust cites also indicates that the framers assumed that treaties would create
individual rights. See id. at 763 & n.2 1, citing Charles Pinckney of South Carolina, quoted in 4
THE DEBATES OF THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION 277-79 (J. Elliot ed. 1941). Even if one accepted Paust's argument-and I do not
suggest it is wrong-in view of the many cases that adopt the standard view, and the fact that
even if extradition treaties are self-executing, there exists a long tradition of viewing them as
not creating individual rights, discussion of that latter point is useful.
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parties' intent determines whether a treaty is self-executing. 95 How-
ever, as Professor Riesenfeld points out, the intent of the parties goes
only to the "international aspect ... whether the treaty aims at imme-
diate creation of rights and duties of private individuals which are
enforceable and to be enforced by domestic tribunals. ' 96 The "do-
mestic constitutional aspect," whether a treaty requires implementing
legislation, depends only on the domestic constitutional law of that
party.
97
Determining whether a treaty provision creates individual judi-
cially-enforceable rights requires an examination of the provision's
"language, context, purpose, negotiating history, and general back-
ground."9 8 One must examine these factors to determine whether the
United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty creates private rights.
V. RAUSCHER 'S BESTOWAL OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS UNDER
EXTRADITION TREATIES IN THE CONTEXT OF
INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION
When Professor Riesenfeld suggests examining "general back-
ground" to discover judicially-enforceable rights for individuals in
treaties, he probably refers to an examination of the specific treaty in
question. However, an inquiry into the "global" general background
must first begin with an examination of Rauscher.99 In that case, the
United States Supreme Court recognized that extradition treaties give
rights to individuals. Rauscher constitutes the leading United States
Supreme Court case on the remedies of a defendant tried in violation
of the rule of specialty in an extradition treaty.1°° The Rauscher
Court, in arriving at its holding, determined that the defendant him-
self had rights "growing out of [the] treaty."' 0 1 Thus, Rauscher de-
serves detailed analysis.
The United States requested the extradition of Rauscher, a naval
95. E.g., International Human Rights Treaties: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 314, 315 (1979) (letter from Robert B. Owen, Legal
Adviser, Dep't of State, to Senator Jacob K. Javits).
96. Riesenfeld, supra note 92, at 896.
97. Id. at 897, 898.
98. Id. at 899. Numerous variations on that test have been proposed. See, e.g., People of
Saipan ex rel. Guerrero v. United States Dep't of Interior, 502 F.2d 90, 97 (9th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 1003 (1975); Lillich, supra note 90, at 381 n.67.
99. 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
100. See also Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309 (1907); Cosgrove v. Winney, 174 U.S. 64
(1899).
101. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 419.
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officer, from Great Britain for the murder of a crewman on his ship.
Great Britain transported Rauscher to the United States pursuant to
the Ashburton Treaty.10 2 However the Circuit Court for the South-
ern District of New York tried him not for murder, but for cruel and
unusual punishment. This trial took place under a different criminal
statute, but for the identical acts alleged in the extradition
proceeding. 
0 3
In defending against the charge, Rauscher raised the doctrine of
specialty.1 4 Justice Miller, writing for the Court, began by pointing
out that the surrendering of a fugitive by one country to another "has
never been recognized as among those obligations of one government
toward another which rests upon established principles of interna-
tional law."' 0 5 The Court discussed the need for a treaty and the fact
that a dispute between the United States and Great Britain had arisen
with regard to whether a defendant extradited from Great Britain
could be tried for a crime not mentioned in the extradition demand. 16
The Court then considered what Professor Riesenfeld calls the domes-
tic self-executing aspect of the United States-Great Britain Extradi-
tion Treaty.10 7
The Court noted that in England, duties arising from treaties are
"matters confided wholly for their execution and enforcement to the
executive branch of the government."'' 0 8 However, the Court wrote
102. Ashburton Treaty, Aug. 9, 1842, art. X, 8 Stat. 576.
103. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 409.
104. In Fiocconi v. Attorney General, 462 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1972), the Second Circuit, in
an opinion by Judge Friendly, noted that Rauscher was decided against a background of dis-
putes at the diplomatic level between Great Britain and the United States. The disputes cen-
tered on whether the United States could try an extradited defendant for an offense other than
that named in the extradition demand. Id. at 480. In effect, subsequent courts have inter-
preted the discussion in Fiocconi as equivalent to finding that there was a protest by Great
Britain in Rauscher. See, e.g., United States v. Kaufman, 858 F.2d 994, 1009 (5th Cir. 1988).
However, the Rauscher Court nowhere indicated that a protest was required. The Fiocconi
court relied on Rauscher in holding that extraditions pursuant to international comity must
adhere to specialty restrictions just as those extraditions accomplished pursuant to a treaty.
The court stated that
Rauscher's conviction of an offense for which he was not and could not have been
extradited did not violate the treaty, which was silent as to the rights of a person
extradited thereunder; it violated a rule of what we would now call United States
foreign relations law devised by courts to implement the treaty.
Fiocconi, 462 F.2d at 479. This last sentence is dictum in Fiocconi and, as discussed in the text,
contrary to Rauscher.
105. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 412.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 417-18.
108. Id. at 417.
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that
[i]n the United States a different principle is established. Our con-
stitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is conse-
quently to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of
the legislature whenever it operates of itself, without the aid of any
legislative provision; but when the terms of the stipulation import a
contract, when either of the parties engages to perform a particular
act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial de-
partment; and the legislature must execute the contract before it
can become a rule for the court. 9
The Rauscher Court next referred to the discussion of self-exe-
cuting treaties in the Head-Money Cases."0 Quoting from those
cases, the Court wrote that:
a treaty may also contain provisions which confer certain rights
upon the citizens or subjects of one of the nations residing in the
territorial limits of the other, which partake of the nature of mu-
nicipal law, and which are capable of enforcement as between pri-
vate parties in the courts of the county."'
Without further discussion, the Court noted that the Ashburton
Treaty was the supreme law of the land, that courts were bound to
take judicial notice of it, and that courts were bound "to enforce in
any appropriate proceeding the rights of persons growing out of that
treaty."" 12 Therefore, it seems apparent that the Rauscher Court be-
lieved that the extradition treaty created rights in Rauscher and not
simply that Rauscher could enforce rights derivatively gained from
Great Britain.
After discussing the Ashburton Treaty, the Court analyzed
whether the treaty departed from recognized rules of public interna-
tional law, which did not permit extradition but allowed a state to
extradite a person at the request of another state. " 3 Again, the Court
assumed that the individual possessed rights, stating:
109. Id. at 418 (citing Foster v. Nielson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829)).
110. 112 U.S. 580 (1884). The Rauscher Court stated:
A treaty, then, is a law of the land, as an act of congress is, whenever its provisions
prescribe a rule by which the rights of the private citizen or subject may be deter-
mined. And, when such rights are of a nature to be enforced in a court of justice,
that court resorts to the treaty for a rule of decision for the case before it as it would
to a statute.
Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 419.
111. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 418.
112. Id. at 419.
113. Id. at 420.
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Nor can it be said that, in the exercise of such a delicate power
under a treaty so well guarded in every particular, its provisions
are obligatory alone on the state which makes the surrender of the
fugitive, and that fugitive passes into the hands of the country
which charges him with the offense, free from all the positive re-
quirements and just implications of the treaty under which the
transfer of his person takes place. A moment before he is under
the protection of a government which has afforded him asylum
from which he can only be taken under a very limited form of pro-
cedure, and a moment after he is found in the possession of another
sovereignty by virtue of that proceeding, but divested of all the
rights which he had the moment before, and all the rights which
the law governing that proceeding was intended to secure."14
The Court concluded that a person brought into the jurisdiction
under an extradition treaty can only stand trial for an offense de-
scribed in the treaty and for which he was extradited if "a reasonable
time and opportunity had been given him, after his release or trial
upon such charge, to return to the country from whose asylum he had
been forcibly taken under those proceedings." ' 15
Having arrived at its holding, the Court made another observa-
tion that reinforced its view that Rauscher possessed his own rights.
It pointed out that "the operation of this principle of the recognition
of the rights of prisoners," in circumstances such as the one before it,
relieved a troublesome element from the relationship between the ex-
ecutive branch of the federal government and state courts." 6 If the
only way of enforcing treaty obligations is "through the action of the
respective national governments, it would seem that the government
appealed to ought to have the right to see that the treaty is faithfully
observed, and the rights of the parties under it [are] protected."' ' 7
Thus, if an extraditee were tried in the state court and that court
"fail[ed] to give due effect to the rights of the party under the
treaty,""18 the party could seek a writ of error from the Supreme
Court of the United States to the state court. Once the writ is se-
cured, the state court would determine the treaty's effect upon the
rights asserted by the prisoner." 9 However, if the party is under
arrest and desires a more speedy remedy in order to secure his release,
114. Id. at 421.
115. Id. at 430.
116. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 430.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 431.
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he could petition for a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court.
The federal court could issue the writ on the ground that the ex-
traditee's liberty has been unconstitutionally restrained. Alterna-
tively, he may make the same argument under a law or treaty of the
United States in federal court.120 If the individual successfully pleads
his case, he will be discharged. 121 State courts could also issue such a
writ. 122 Although this analysis indicates that the offended govern-
ment could protest the trial, it also appears to assume that the pris-
oner has certain rights flowing from the treaty, independent of any
rights of his government.
In cases subsequent to Rauscher, the Supreme Court has found
that United States courts lack jurisdiction when a defendant appears
before them in violation of a treaty.1 23 For example, in Johnson v.
Browne, the Supreme Court applied the doctrine of specialty without
any protest from Canada, the offended government.1 24 In Cosgrove v.
Winney, 25 again without protest, the Court released a prisoner held
in violation of the doctrine of specialty contained in the 1890 treaty
between the United States and Great Britain. 26 The cases are not
wholly limited to violations of the doctrine of specialty. In Cook v.
United States, 27 the Supreme Court held that the cargo of a ship,
seized outside the United States territorial waters in violation of the
treaty between the United States and Great Britain of May 22,
1924,128 could not be retained. 129 Again, in Cook, the offended state
did not lodge a protest.
According to Rauscher and its progeny, extradition treaties con-
fer rights on individuals. In other words, an individual has standing
to assert a violation of an extradition treaty in the absence of diplo-
120. Id.
121. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 431.
122. Id.
123. See Dickinson, supra note 11; Morgenstern, supra note 70, at 279.
124. 205 U.S. 309 (1907). In Johnson, however, the Court did assume that the Canadian
government would have refused to extradite. Id. at 316-17.
125. 174 U.S. 64 (1899).
126. Promulgated Mar. 25, 1890, 26 Stat. 1508. The government violated article 3, which
forbids trying a person for a crime other than that for which he was extradited, until the
extraditee can return to the country from which he was surrendered. Here Cosgrove, on trial
for an offense for which he was properly extradited, returned to Canada, but voluntarily came
back to the United States, where he was indicted for another crime. Cosgrove, 174 U.S. at 65.
127. 288 U.S. 102 (1933).
128. Convention Between the United States and Great Britain for Prevention of Smug-
gling of Intoxicating Liquors, 43 Stat. 1761 (1924).
129. Cook, 288 U.S. at 121-22.
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matic protest. Nonetheless, federal courts have split on this issue,
even as applied to violations of the doctrine of specialty.13 0 The cases
on both sides of the issue are characterized by a remarkable paucity of
analysis. These cases generally rest on the theory that treaties protect
the rights of sovereigns, rather than individuals. They tend not to
discuss what exactly those sovereign rights are, or why extradition
treaties, which since Rauscher have been understood to be capable of
creating individual rights, do not confer rights on individuals. They
do not even reference the detailed analysis employed by courts in
dealing with whether treaties create individual rights. 13' The Restate-
ment (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States recognizes
the inconsistency of the cases, but is additionally inconsistent itself.
On the one hand, it states that "[b]oth the person extradited and the
extraditing state are beneficiaries of the doctrine [of specialty]."1 32 On
the other hand, it states that "the obligation embodied in the doctrine
of specialty runs to the requested state.'
33
Despite the split in authority at the circuit court level, the
Supreme Court has allowed individuals to assert rights arising under
extradition treaties. This concurs with the minority view that individ-
uals may challenge the illegality of their removal from. another juris-
diction. 34 After Rauscher, one could argue that a presumption exists
130. Compare United States v. Kaufman, 858 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1988), petition for reh'g
denied, 874 F.2d 242, 243 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (only a nation that is party to a treaty
may complain of a breach of the treaty); Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 583-84 (6th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986) ("right to insist on application of the principle of
specialty belongs to the requested state, not to the individual whose extradition is requested";
extradition from United States) (citing Berenguer v. Vance, 473 F. Supp. 1195, 1197 (D.D.C.
1979)); Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 884 (1973) (prin-
ciple of specialty is privilege of asylum state, rather than right of accused; extradition from
United States); United States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32, 37-38 (1st Cir. 1981) ("under interna-
tional law, it is the contracting foreign government, not the defendant, that would have the
right to complain about a violation") with United States v. Diwan, 864 F.2d 715, 720-21 (11 th
Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3249 (1989) ("[tlhe extradited individual.., can raise only those
objections to the extradition process that the surrendering country might consider a breach of
the extradition treaty"); United States v. Cuevas, 847 F.2d 1417, 1426 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
489 U.S. 1012 (1989) ("person extradited may raise whatever objections the extraditing coun-
try would have been entitled to raise"); Leighnor v. Turner, 884 F.2d 385, 388 (8th Cir. 1989),
following United States v. Thirion, 813 F.2d 146, 151 n.5 (8th Cir. 1987).
131. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 130; see also Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851
(D.C. Cir. 1976).
132. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 477 comment b (1987).
133. Id.
134. Fiscal, 9 ANN. DIG. & REP. OF PUB. INT'L CASES at 402.
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that extradition treaties create rights in individuals and that the gov-
ernment must rebut that presumption.
VI. APPLYING RAUSCHER TO ALVAREZ-MACHAIN'S
PREDICAMENT: FINDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS UNDER
THE UNITED STATES-MEXICO TREATY
Rauscher dealt with the doctrine of specialty. The treaty lan-
guage in Rauscher imparted no explicit rights to individuals. Rather,
it simply stated that the parties "shall... deliver up" persons charged
with specified crimes and only implicitly precluded trial for other
crimes. However, the Court recognized this implied limitation and
allowed Rauscher to assert the limitation. The issue in Alvarez-
Machain's case is different. Accordingly, one should carefully ex-
amine the United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty in order to deter-
mine if the language and context indicate the parties' intent to impart
rights to individuals.
The treaty language indicates that, at least in part, it creates en-
forceable individual rights. Most important, the treaty negates an ob-
ligation on the part of either party to extradite its own nationals:
"Neither Contracting Party shall be bound to deliver up its own na-
tionals, but the executive authority of the requested Party shall, if not
prevented by the laws of that Party, have the power to deliver them
up if, in its discretion, it be deemed proper to do so.' 13 5 Although
this provision grants the executive of the requested party discretion to
extradite its own nationals, it also appears to give those nationals an
opportunity to challenge an extradition either as a violation of the
laws of the requested party or, under a lower standard, as an abuse of
discretion. 136
Provisions forbidding extradition of nationals are not logically
necessary. Extradition treaties facilitate the apprehension and pun-
ishment of criminals; if a national of a requested state is properly sub-
ject to extradition, excluding her from the ambit of the treaty impedes
the criminal process, unless the national state prosecutes her. None-
theless, "national clauses" began appearing in French extradition
treaties of the mid-nineteenth century. 3 7 European countries and, to
135. United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 15, art. IX(1).
136. But see I. SHEARER, supra note 3, at 115 (Mexican municipal law vests discretion in
executive). Mexican practice contrasts with that of other states, where the decision is judicial.
Id. at 117. This history of article IX(l) is discussed in Valentine v. United States, 299 U.S. 5,
13-16 (1936).
137. I. SHEARER, supra note 3, at 17.
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a lesser degree, Latin American countries use such clauses. However,
the United States and British Commonwealth countries generally try
to exclude these clauses from their treaties. 38 The different ap-
proaches flow, in part, from the fact that many civil-law jurisdictions
have extraterritorial criminal laws, which permit them to exercise ju-
risdiction on the basis of nationality. This allows those countries to
punish their nationals for crimes committed abroad. Conversely,
common-law states tend to use extraterritorial laws more sparingly. 
139
Thus, if a person commits a crime abroad and returns home, civil-law
states are more likely to have the power to prosecute criminals than
are common-law states.' 40
Reasons usually given for excluding nationals focus on protect-
ing individuals, while largely ignoring the protection of sovereign in-
terests, except to the extent that a sovereign has an interest in
protecting its citizens. 141 These reasons are: (1) a person should be
tried by her "natural judges" (i.e., her peers); (2) a state owes a duty
of protection to its citizens; (3) a citizen has a right to stay undis-
turbed in her homeland; and (4) a person may not receive a fair trial
by a foreign jury. Moreover, where the crime was committed on asy-
lum state territory and is punishable under that state's law, and where
the abducting state is prosecuting the extraterritorial offense, it is par-
ticularly apparent that the rationales for nonextradition apply. Re-
gardless of the validity of these rationales, a threatened individual or
her state may equally advance these justifications. The issue is not
simply that another state has violated the territory of the other treaty
party, but that an individual is deprived of protected rights.
Treaty clauses precluding extradition of nationals fall into two
categories, absolute and discretionary. 142 The corresponding provi-
sion in the United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty is a typical dis-
cretionary clause. The clause, in article IX, requires Mexico to try its
nationals if it does not grant extradition. 143 Dean Shearer points out
that even discretionary clauses tend to be absolute in practice. 144
Thus, while it is difficult to argue from the language of article IX that
the treaty explicitly gives rights to individuals, it does appear to ne-
138. Id. at 97-118.
139. Alvarez-Machain was, however, indicted for an extraterritorial offense.
140. Garner, supra note 4, at 484.
141. I. SHEARER, supra note 3, at 98, 118-21.
142. Id. at 94.
143. United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 15, art. IX(2).
144. I. SHEARER, supra note 3, at 126.
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gate the argument that governmental silence amounts to
acquiescence.
Moreover, the next paragraph in article IX states that, "if extra-
dition is not granted pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, the re-
quested Party shall admit the case to its competent authorities for the
purpose of prosecution, provided that Party has jurisdiction over the
offense." 145 Again, it appears that the requested party must take some
affirmative action in order to permit the national's extradition.
Similarly, the requested party may expressly waive the "rule of
specialty.''14 A person extradited under the present treaty shall not
be detained, tried, or punished in the United States for an offense
other than that for which extradition has been granted. Nor may the
person undergo extradition by that party to a third state unless the
requested party has given its consent to his detention, trial, punish-
ment, or extradition to the third state for an offense other than that
for which the extradition was granted.147
Moreover, the treaty sets out detailed requirements in article X
for extradition procedures and documents required to initiate the ex-
tradition process. These provisions permit an individual to challenge
the basis for the extradition.
48
Provisions in the treaty which permit one of the parties to limit
explicit rules governing extradition (either the rule against extraditing
nationals or the rule of specialty) only when the requested party takes
an affirmative act, make it dubious that the absence of such affirma-
tive action should automatically constitute acquiescence in an abduc-
tion. Express language in the United States-Mexico Extradition
Treaty undermines the United States courts' understanding that a
lack of protest in the face of a treaty violation constitutes consent to
the abduction.
Obviously, the nonacquiescence argument has more force with
respect to a state's right to waive the rule of specialty. Under article
XVII(1)(c), the requested party must consent to a derogation from
the rule of specialty. One could interpret consent as including tacit
consent. However, in view of the fact that more precise words would
145. United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 15, art. IX(2).
146. Id.
147. Id. art. XVII(1)(c).
148. Although early on, the executive branches of governments had rather complete com-
petence to make extradition decisions, the modem trend, going back to 1833, especially in
common-law countries, is to assign the decision to the judicial branch. See I. SHEARER, supra
note 3, at 197-200.
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encompass that notion, such as the "acquiescence" often assumed by
United States courts to constitute consent,1 49 that reading is question-
able. On the other hand, the provision relating to nonextradition of
nationals does not by its terms demand an expression of consent.
Nonetheless, because Mexico must "grant" such an extradition, and
because the extradition is subject to the other procedural safeguards,
it appears fair to interpret the treaty as requiring more than mere
silence to validate an extradition.
One may argue, however, that the two provisions discussed
above simply give a Mexican citizen the right to complain to her own
government, and not the right to assert a violation against the United
States. However, the treaty language need not be so explicit. The
treaty by its operation has clothed nationals with certain protections.
Typically, a protected person should be permitted to assert her own
rights. In addition, these protections are not linguistically different in
any material way from the protections that the specialty clauses offer.
Thus, there is no reason to limit the right of one asserting those rights
more than one would limit the rights of an individual asserting a vio-
lation of specialty. Finally, looking to the global context, under Rau-
scher, the treaty is self-executing. Thus, at a minimum, Mexico may
enforce the treaty in United States courts. If a violation has occurred,
the most natural party to assert the violation is the abducted individ-
ual. Requiring the state to argue the violation may needlessly compli-
cate diplomatic relations. Moreover, the Rauscher Court indicates
that an extradition treaty permits individuals to assert violations of
the specialty doctrine without any intermediate steps. The absence of
a distinction between Mexico's functions under the specialty clause
and the national clauses indicates that individuals should have the
right to assert rights under the latter.
In view of both the procedural requirements that must precede
an extradition and the express prohibitions on extradition of nationals
and derogation of the rule of specialty, it seems somewhat odd to say
that a violation of the treaty cannot occur in the absence of a pro-
test. 1o The treaty provisions in the United States-Mexico Extradition
Treaty are more detailed than those at issue in Rauscher. Yet, the
Rauscher Court had no problem with Rauscher's assertion of his
149. E.g., Fiocconi, 462 F.2d at 481.
150. The court implicitly found that Alvarez-Machain was extradited, since the court re-
jected as "absurd" the government's argument that in the instant case a violation of the rule of
specialty might violate the treaty, but the removal of Alvarez-Machain did not. Caro-Quin-
tero, 745 F. Supp. at 610.
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rights. 151 It would seem to follow that the United States-Mexico Ex-
tradition Treaty implicitly creates judicially-enforceable rights in
nationals.
The history of the national clause in the United States-Mexico
Extradition Treaty does not throw additional light on the question of
the creation of individual rights. The 1861 version of the treaty con-
tained an article which stated that neither party was bound to deliver
its own citizens. In 1891, the present language permitting discretion-
ary rendition was added "to clarify the meaning of the original
formula and to remove doubt as to its meaning which has been cast
upon it by an erroneous interpretation by the Department of State
and a decision of an inferior federal court."'1 2 The fact that parties
were not required to extradite nationals has been read to mean that
they could not extradite nationals. The change is thus unrelated to
the question of individual rights.
Beyond the language that it contains, the treaty lacks certain lan-
guage that would fortify the argument that an individual lacks stand-
ing to assert his rights when a treaty violation takes place. In 1973,
prior to the United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty's 1979 signing,
the United States and Switzerland signed their Treaty on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters.1 53 That treaty expressly provides
that, with certain enumerated exceptions, the treaty "shall not give
rise on the part of any person of the right to take any action in the
United States to suppress or exclude any evidence or to obtain other
judicial relief in connection with requests" under the treaty.' 5 In
view of Rauscher, if the United States had wished to achieve a similar
end in its extradition treaty with Mexico, it could have inserted simi-
lar language.
Other criteria for determining whether a treaty creates individual
rights include the availability of alternative remedies and the conse-
quences of failing to find enforceable rights.1 55 If no other remedies
exist, a stronger argument arises that individual rights exist. Other-
151. Typically, the argument that multilateral treaties do not create judicially enforceable
rights in individuals relies on the imprecise and hortatory language of the treaty. See, e.g., Sei
Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 722, 242 P.2d 617, 620 (1952).
152. Garner, supra note 4, at 483 (referring to Ex Parte McCabe, 46 F. 363 (W.D. Tex.
1891)).
153. May 25, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302.
154. Id. at 37; see United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025, 1029-30 (2d Cir. 1985).
155. People of Saipan ex tel Guerrero v. United States Dep't of Interior, 502 F.2d 90 (9th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1003 (1975).
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wise, an abducted person possesses no recourse or remedy. It is
highly unlikely that a defendant would sue his abductors. While the
abducted person's own state can pursue its remedies, the possibilities
that it may not do so, for a variety of reasons, make those remedies
too uncertain. Likewise, the consequences of failing to enforce the
treaty in court will mean that the abducted person has no effective
remedy.
The notion that an individual found in one state, who is the citi-
zen of another state, has rights under a treaty is hardly novel. For
example, in Asakura v. Seattle,156 a Japanese citizen invoked a treaty
of friendship, commerce, and navigation to overcome a local ordi-
nance which conflicted with the treaty. While a state can assert a
claim of responsibility under international law by virtue of a protest
or diplomatic approaches, the right -the state asserts is different from
the right of an individual under a self-executing treaty. Accordingly,
whether or not a state asserts a violation of a treaty, an individual
may still assert the violation of the treaty as to her own person. 157
Taken together, these facts indicate that individuals have, and
can enforce, rights under the treaty. Of course, these considerations
are not dispositive. In the absence of express language creating pri-
vate rights, it is difficult to gather the parties' intent. While Rauscher
allows individuals to invoke extradition treaties, numerous cases do
not. These cases sit against a background of international law doc-
trine that treaties do not create such rights. Likewise, the counter to
the argument that additional treaty language was available to with-
hold private rights is that the parties could have inserted language
confirming such rights. Nonetheless, where a treaty imposes limits on
156. 265 U.S. 332 (1924).
157. Even if a treaty creates individual rights, it is often said that those rights belong to
residents of the state in which the rights are asserted. Here, one might argue that the United
States did not intend to create rights in a Mexican national, despite whatever intention the
government of Mexico may have had. In a recent case, the United States Supreme Court held
that the fourth amendment did not apply extraterritorially. United States v. Verdugo-Ur-
quidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990). However, in that case, the Court's holding turned upon the
definition of "the people" in the fourth amendment, which gives to the people the "right... to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures .... " The Court found that "people" was a term of art applying to "the people of the
United States" and not to "aliens outside of the United States territory." Id. at 1061. The
context of a foreign subject protected by an extradition treaty is not so parochial. The question
does not simply involve the intention of the United States, but also involves the intention of the
other contracting party, in this case Mexico. If, as argued, Mexico intended to bestow individ-
ual rights on its citizens, as the government of Japan apparently did in the Asakura case, it is
not for the United States unilaterally to deny the existence of those rights.
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one government's power, which obviously protect a discrete class of
people, it seems reasonable that those people have standing to enforce
the treaty.1
5 8
This does not mean that a response of some sort by the requested
state has no role in the process if someone is abducted from its terri-
tory. 159 Cases may exist in which a state wants a person extradited,
despite the illegality of the removal. One imagines that Argentina did
not wish to argue too strenuously that it wanted Eichmann back,
although it probably did not like Israeli agents snatching people from
its territory.60 In an even more timely scenario, it is conceivable that
if the United States abducted a member of the Medellin drug cartel
from Colombia, the government of Colombia might not want him re-
turned, but might not want to face the consequences of saying so.
Tacit acquiescence and hiding behind the "rule" of mala captus, bene
detentus 6 1 could solve the problem. However, where a state has en-
tered a treaty requiring it to take affirmative steps to extradite its citi-
zens, the state should, as a matter of principle, speak out if the treaty
permits their abduction.
In the event that a state makes a conscious decision to acquiesce
in an abduction, in effect ratifying the "extradition," it could, as a
matter of international law, apparently choose to do so. Many cases
involve situations in which states have expressly acquiesced in a viola-
tion of the rule of specialty 162 or have knowingly participated in what
amounts to a deportation of the individual. 63 In cases where foreign
agents abduct a national from her own territory in apparent violation
of an extradition treaty, it would not seem too stringent a requirement
158. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
159. In proposing a restriction on a state's ability to prosecute abducted people, Professor
Dickinson would have permitted offended states to consent. See Dickinson, supra note 11.
160. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. at 5-6.
161. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
162. E.g., Diwan, 864 F.2d at 720-21 (British Home Office note confirmed "that the
United Kingdom has no objection to the indictment of Ms. Diwan as proposed"); Najohn, 785
F.2d at 1422-23 (record included "a letter from the Swiss Embassy to the United States asking
for prosecution and agreeing that the principle of specialty was suspended"); cf Leighnor, 884
F.2d at 390 (sentence enhancement based upon pre-extradition conduct not included within an
offense for which extradition was granted was permitted by Eighth Circuit Court in view of
Federal Republic of Germany court statements acknowledging prisoner's prior escape and use
of false passport).
163. E.g., Valot, 625 F.2d at 310; Gengler, 510 F.2d at 63; Cordero, 668 F.2d at 37-38;
United States v. Lovato, 520 F.2d 1270, 1272 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 985 (1975).
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on the prosecution to seek a confirmation from the state of nationality
that it had not objected to the extradition.
In short, the better rule would be that where a treaty appears to
confer individual rights, the presumption should be that such individ-
ual rights exist. In the absence of any express statements of acquies-
cence, the individual could then assert those rights.
VII. THE ROLE OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY IN INTERNATIONAL
EXTRADITION
The foregoing thoughts force one to consider the nature of state
sovereignty. As noted above, the "requirement" that the requested
state lodge a protest flows from the theory that extradition treaties
confer rights only on states. This requirement theoretically protects a
state's sovereignty. Courts adopting this rule assume a view of inter-
national law in which treaties do not confer rights on individuals.
Other courts apparently adopt a similar view which allows individuals
to raise violations of extradition treaties, but holds that an individual's
right to raise a violation is derivative of the right of the requested
state. ,64
"State sovereignty" is a concept deriving originally from juris-
prudence and later from political theory.' 6- Brierly points out that
after 400 years of metamorphosis, sovereignty "is merely a term
which designates an aggregate of particular and very extensive claims
that states make for themselves in their relations with other states." ,66
The concept has little explanatory power for the relations between a
state and its people. In practice and in theory, the spectrum of do-
mestic political systems is too diverse for a generic term like "sover-
eignty" to be of any real aid in answering specific questions, such as
whether individuals have rights under treaties. Yet that question in-
volves an overlap of external and internal issues. By entering into a
164. Eg., United States v. Thirion, 813 F.2d 146, 151 n.5 (8th Cir. 1987). Although the
issue is stated in terms of standing, it is interrelated with, and perhaps indistinguishable from,
the question whether the offended state must protest. If a protest is an element of the treaty
violation, an individual cannot raise the violation in the absence of assistance from the of-
fended state, so that at least standing is derivative. On the other hand, if an individual can, in
the absence of a protest, raise the issue of a treaty violation, it would appear that the treaty
confers at least some rights on the individual. Therefore, although the courts seem to adhere
to a hierarchical view of international law, under which customary and treaty obligations exist
only between states, permitting individuals themselves to raise treaty violations, even if only in
a "derivative" capacity, seems to some extent a relaxation of the hierarchical hypothesis.
165. J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONs 7-16 (Waldock 6th ed. 1963).
166. Id. at 47.
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treaty that confers certain discretionary power on the state, vis-i-vis
its nationals and the other treaty party, may the state simultaneously
give rights to its nationals?
A state "is an entity that has a defined territory and a permanent
population, under the control of its own government, and that en-
gages in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other
such entities." 167 One of a state's functions is the protection of its
citizens.1 68 Thus, the abduction of a citizen of one state by agents of
another state affronts the sovereignty of the state of nationality in sev-
eral ways. The affront is not only that one state exercises its power
within the territory of the other, an insult to some highly abstract
ideas of sovereignty, but the more palpable affront is that the latter
state fails to fulfill its primary obligation of protection. Still, it does
not automatically follow that, by entering into an extradition treaty
with explicit limitations on extradition of nationals and on extradition
procedures generally, a state protects its citizens by giving them the
ability to attack allegedly improper extradition in the courts of the
abducting state. With or without a treaty, diplomatic means exist for
the state to vindicate the affront to its sovereignty. On the other
hand, the question is whether such a treaty gives rights to the national
of one state to enforce the treaty. The answer cannot be that it does
not, simply because "sovereign rights" are at issue.
State sovereignty is not a priori incompatible with individual
rights. Professor Reisman has written recently, "International law
still protects sovereignty, but-not surprisingly-it is the peoples'
sovereignty rather than the sovereign's sovereignty."'' 69 While Profes-
sor Reisman was considering the right of states to intervene to depose
illegitimate "caudillos," his broader point has force here as well. A
state may actualize the protective aspect of its sovereignty by empow-
ering its citizens to litigate their rights in foreign courts. It does not
follow that because treaties give rights to states, they deny them to
individuals. Rather, giving rights to individuals expresses one of the
principal reasons states exist and is a tactic for protecting those rights.
Clearly, this argument can prove too much. Treaties do not nec-
essarily give rights to individuals, but the prevailing presumption that
because extradition treaties are between states, only states have rights
167. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 201 (1987).
168. Eg., J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, supra note 92, at 488.
169. Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84 AM.
J. INT'L L. 866, 869 (1990).
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under them, seems to be wrong. It would appear better to reverse the
presumption. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, individuals
should have rights under such treaties. Because states may legiti-
mately have broader interests than those of an individual, in a given
case it may be necessary to balance a state's interests with the interests
of its citizens. Professor D'Amato has characterized the perception of
states as "opaque," "transparent," or "translucent," depending on
whether an individual's international human rights are nonexistent,
whether people claim the whole set of those rights, or whether the
people and the state each claim some of the available "rights."' 70 The
approach advocated here is "translucency": both the state and the
individual have rights. A conflict between rights that reside in an in-
dividual and those that are derivative of the state would arise if an
abducted individual alleged a treaty violation and the state demurred.
The state's right as sovereign would clash with the state's duty to pro-
tect one of its citizens. This situation stands out most clearly in cases
where the abducted individual is a national of the state in which the
abduction occurred. If the state expressly acquiesces in the abduc-
tion, presumably it does so out of broader policy concerns. It is quite
legitimate for the state to assert those broader interests. In those
cases, presumably United States courts would abstain, and the indi-
vidual's argument that the extradition was unlawful would be ad-
dressed to the individual's national courts. Under the act of state
doctrine,' 7 ' United States courts would almost certainly refuse to de-
cide the legality of the "deportation" or ratified abduction. But where
an extradition treaty appears to require some affirmative statement,
silence should not suffice.
VIII. CONCLUSION
By entering into the extradition treaty with Mexico, the United
States gained an advantage-the ability to extradite fugitives from the
United States who have fled to Mexico and those who have allegedly
committed crimes elsewhere and are found in Mexico, including Mex-
ican nationals, at the discretion of the Mexican government. In ex-
change, the United States agreed to abide by certain procedures. In
the absence of an extradition treaty, the United States would be forced
to rely upon much more discretion-laden decisions by the government
170. D'Arnato, The Relation of the Individual to the State in the Era of Human Rights, 24
TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 7 (1989).
171. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421-22 (1964).
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of Mexico (or, of course, abduction plain and simple). By entering
into the treaty, the United States gave up a certain measure of its own
freedom of action. If, as argued here, by giving up that freedom of
action, the United States gave certain rights to Mexican nationals, it
seems a relatively small price to pay for the ability to extradite fugi-
tives in a systematic way.
The fact that the suspect is accused not only of a crime that is
terrible under any circumstances, but one that has a high political
proffle, does not justify United States agents either acting illegally as a
general matter 172 or violating the treaty. It seems contrary to the pro-
gressive development of international human rights law to argue that
Alvarez-Machain's only hope of release following his kidnapping rests
on the vagaries of the politics of United States-Mexican relations.
The fact that Alvarez-Machain's own government might not have
seen fit to protest should not limit his ability to contend that the
United States must release him.
172. This Article has not considered the correctness of the court's decision to reject Alva-
rez-Machain's arguments based on the United Nations Charter or other norms of international
law. At a minimum, the DEA agents' actions raise serious questions under these bodies of
law.
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